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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GALE BARNEY JUDD,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
vs.

case No. 16,332

ROWLEY'S CHERRY HILL ORCHARDS,
INC., a Corporation, and
E. W. ELFAWN WALL,
Defendants and
Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
Litigation in this case arises out of an action for
personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a result of an
automobile collision between the plaintiff, Gale Barney Judd,
and the defendant, Elfawn HaL.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Jury trial was held on December 11th and 12th, 1978.
After presentation of all the evidence and in answer to "special
interrogatories" the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff
finding the defendant 70% at fault and the plaintiff 30% at fault.
The jury awarded total damages for the plaintiff in the amount of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

$25,000.00; special damages were awarded in the amount of
$15,000.00 and general damages were awarded in the amount of
$10,000.00.

In accordance with Utah Code Annotated, 1953,

Section 78-27-38, regarding the determination of damages in
a comparative negligence case, the court then reduced the total
amount of damages to be awarded the plaintiff by 30% and entered
judgment on the verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of
$17,500.00.

Plaintiff's motions to amend the judgment or for

a new trial were subsequently denied and this appeal was filed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants-Respondents seek to have the jury verdict
in favor of the plaintiff affirmed and the damage award, as
determined by the jury and properly reduced by the court, sustained.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The record supports the following statement of facts.
Plaintiff and defendant, as operators of motor vehicles, I
were involved in a col lis ion January 20, 1977, on a country road- I
!
way. The roadway was 21 feet wide and consisted of loosely packed 1
gravel that had been oiled 2 to 3 days before. R248, Exhibits 3-14.[
•s i
" 1
I
they approached each other the vehicles were both traveling in t~!

The drivers were proceeding in opposite directions.

middle of the road, as was the usual practice in that area. R39l
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1

plaintiff reacted by turning right and slamming on her brakes.
R246

After plaintiff turned her vehicle right and the brakes

took hold, plaintiff was still left of center.

Exhibit 14.

Defendant reacted by applying his brakes but did not turn right.
The parties skidded to a head-on collision.
Trooper Lynn Richardson, the investigating officer,
made measurements and tied his reference point to a hay stack.
R371

Defendant had another patrolman, Gary Johnson, attempt to

check Lynn Richardson's measurements and prepare a map of the
scene.

Trooper Richardson refused to furnish his field notes

to Trooper Johnson.

R370

The hay stack, which was the refer-

ence point, had been moved from the time of the accident to the
time Trooper Johnson tried to verify measurements.

R371

The jury unanimously concluded that defendant was 70%
at fault and plaintiff was 30% at fault in causing the collision.
R462
Plaintiff suffered two fractured knee caps in the accident and a dislocation of the right ankle.

Six months after the

accident, as testified by Dr. David C. Flinders, plaintiff's
physician, plaintiff told him in the course of a physical examination
for a L,D,S, Mission, that she walked or jogged one mile a day with
leg pains and was able to sat~~£acLurily perform her duties as a
practical nurse without pain.

R88

That because of an incomplete

reduction of the fracture to the right knee cap, the knee cap was
removed by Dr. Eugene H. Chapman.

R 307

Dr. Edward Spencer testi-
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fied that, in his opinion, the ankle after being reduced was
not impaired. R360

He also testified that the left knee did

not need further corrective surgery and after the removal of
the patella she would be able to perform her household duties,
run and jog, work as a practical nurse and in effect return to

substantially normal activities.

R357, R359, R360

ARGUMENT
POINT I
I
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY THE SUBMISSION 1
OF THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE TO THE JURY,
POINT II
THE JURY DID NOT ERR TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE PLAINTIFF
IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF 1 S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NOS. 6, 7,
AND 9, AND IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT WA~ I
GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO,
6 TO THE JURY.
Points I, II, and III refer to the submission of fact
to the jury as to negligence of the parties under Utah 1 s compara·
tive negligence law.
Because they all involve the same principle they will
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I

be discussed simultaneously.
The court in instruction No. 4 informed the jury as
to what constituted negligence.

JIFU 15.1

The court in instruction No. 6 correctly set forth
the law that it was the duty of each driver to use reasonable
care under the circumstances in driving their vehicles to avoid
danger to themselves and otherc

ar·~

to observe and be aware of

the condition of the highway, the traffic thereon, and other
existing conditions; in that regard, they were obliged to observe
due care in respect to:
1.

To use reasonable care to keep a lookout for other

vehicles, or other conditions reasonably to be anticipated.
2.

To keep their motor vehicles under reasonably safe

and proper control.
3.

To drive at such a speed as was safe, reasonable

and prudent under the circun.stances, having due regard to the
width, surface and condition of the highway, the traffic thereon,
the visibility, and any actual or potential hazards then existing.
4.

To drive their motor vehicles on their own right

side of the highway,

JIFU 21.1 Pages 73-75.

On each one of these specific points, above set forth,
there existed disputed evidence that the jury was required to
resolve.
As stated by the court in instruction No. 11, the jury
was the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and
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the weight of the evidence.

In judging the weight of the testi-

mony and credibility of the witnesses the jury had a right to
take into consideration their bias, their interest in the result
of the suit, or any probable motive or lack thereof to testify
fairly, if any is shown.

The jury could consider the witnesses'

deportment upon the witness stand, the reasonableness of their
statements, their apparent frankness or candor, or the want of
it, their opportunity to know, their ability to understand, and
their capacity to remember.

The jury could consider these matters

together with all of the other facts and circumstances which the I
jury could believe would have a bearing on the truthfulness or
accuracy of the witnesses' statements.

JIFU 3.2, Page 17.

POINT IV
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 8 AND IN
FAILING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 11 AS
REQUESTED WITH REGARD TO DAMAGES.
The jury was adequately instructed regarding damages.
Instruction No. 8 covered standar.l instructions on pain, suffe~ing.l
impairment of bodily functions

disability, impairment of earmng

capacity, doctor bills, hospital bills, medication, loss of wages
and future medical and hospital expenses.

JIFU 90.1, 90.3, 90.6,

90.8, 90.10 Pages 165-168.
POINT V
THE DAMAGES AWARDED BY THE JURY lvERE NaT GROSSLY IN-
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ADEQUATE, AND THE JURY DID NUT DISREGA!ZD THE GREAT WEIGHT OF
THE EVIDENCE AND THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE COURT IN THE AMOUNT
AWARDED FOR DAMAGES,

The general rule, supported by Utah case law, regarding the setting aside of an inadequate verdict in an action for
personal tort has been set out in 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages, Sec.
398, P. 533 and includes the following elements, the verdict

•~ill

be set aside only if:
1.

The amount is so inadequate as to indicate passion,

prejudice, partiality, corruption, or disregard for the
court's instructions;
2.

There was a vital misapprehension or mistake

on the part of the jury; and
3.

It clearly appears from uncontradicted evidence

that the amount of the verdict bears no reasonable relation
to the loss suffered by the plaintiff.
In support of the concept that the mere allegation of
excessive or inadequate damages is insufficient to require a new
trial, the Supreme Court of Utah in Paul v. Kirkendall, 1 Utah 2d, 1;
261 P.2d (1953) said:
Appellant claims here that damages awarded were
"so excessive as to appear prejudicial." Rule 59 (a)
(5), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that a
new trial may be granted on grounds of excessive or
inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under
the influence of passion or prejudice.
It is not enough,
under this rule nor under the code provision which it
supplanted, merely to allege that the amount itself is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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excessive. The amount of the verdict is ordinarily a
matter exclusively for the jury and on the ground of
adequacy of the verdict alone, the court may not interfere with the jury's verdict unless it clearly appears
that the award was rendered under misunderstanding or
prejudice.
When the record is void of any indication of passion or
prejudice, the amount of the award itself does not justify the
conclusion that the award resulted from passion or prejudice.

fu I

Hanson v. General Builders Supply Company, 15 Utah 2d 143; 389 P.1a
61 (1964) the Supreme Court of Utah said:
General damages of $22,500 were awarded by the
I
jury, which to you or me might seem somewhat exaggerated.!
and, depending on anyone else's personal opinion, may
have been poor judgment on the part of the veniremen. I
The urgence on appeal, however, is that the verdict re- 1
fleeted passion and prejudice against the defendants.
There is nothing in the record that would justify this I
court in arriving at such a conclusion . . . . . Under
Rule 59 (a) ( 5), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the excessiveness of damages must appear to have been "given
under the influence of passion or prejudice."
I

I

The award of $25,000.00 being $10,000.00 for general damages and
$15,000.00 for special damages, is not a clear indication of:
1.

The jury's disregard of competent evidence, or

2.

The influence of passion or prejudice.

As stated in Batty v. Mitchell, 575 P.2d 1040, (1978)
the Supreme Court of Utah has held that the award, to be excessive
or inadequate, must clearly (not speculatively) show a disregard
for competent evidence or the influence of passion or prejudice:

,

Also, it is contended the court erred in denying r'
a motion for a new trial under, Rule 59 (a) (5), U,R,C.:.
That rule provides a new trial may be granted because
of the award of excessive damages "appearing to have
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been given under the influence of passion or prejudice."
Generally, the amount of the verdict is a matter exclusively for the ~ury and unless such an award clearly
indicates the jury s disregard of competent evidence or
the influence of passion or pre~udice, the trial court
may not interfere with the jury s determination.
In the absence of a clear indication of passion and
prejudice or disregard for instructions, the jury verdict must
stand and is not subject to additur or new trial.
The assessment of damages is peculiarly within the
prerogative of the jury to determine.
In Campbell v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 113;
388 P.2d 409 (1964) the Utah Supreme Court clearly explained the
function and exclusive domain of the jury to determine damages:
Due to their advantaged position in close proximity to the trial, the parties and the witnesses;
and their practical knowledge of the affairs of life
as a background against which to weigh the evidence,
the assessment of damages is something peculiarly
within the prerogative of the jury to determine, and
the court is extremely reluctant to interfere with
their judgment in that regard. From the plaintiff's
point of view, her insistence that the award is inadequate to her needs and desires is understandable.
But we are obliged to look at the evidence and the
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the verdict.
In doing so,
we do not see it as to entirely beyond reason as to
require that we upset it.
Damages can only be assessed from the evidence presented,
and when the verdict is within any reasonable appraisal of damages
as shown by the evidence it should be permitted to stand.

Bodon v.

Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42, 327 P.2d 826 (1958)
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POINT VI
THE JURY DID NOT ERR IN THE AWARDING OF SPECIAL
DAMAGES.
Medical specials were stipulated as $8,335.08.
to the loss of earnings to tim0 or

~ial,

the evidence

As

w~s

disputed as to plaintiff's ability to work and therefore,
defendants contend the award was within the facts as established
by the evidence.

CONCLUSION
The trial court's conduct in directing the litigation
in the instance action was in accordance with accepted practice
and procedures.
The instruction glven the jury regarding both parties'
duties in operating their respective vehicles covered the matter
adequately and in accordance with law.
There was adequate testimony and evidence presented
regarding the collision, to allow reasonable minds to differ in
determining fault and damages.

The trial court properly submittec

the factual issues to the jury for determination.

The jury is the

sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of
the evidence.

There was substantial evidence to support the

jury's verdict and award of damages.
The trial court operated within the discretion granted
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to it and did not corrnnit prejudicial error.
Defendants respectfully request the court to support
the procedural steps that are heretofore taken and allow the
verdict of the jury as made to stand.

·' ;u/

Respectfully submitted this ~day of August, 1979.
\

))

//diJ;/:-~

)

\:::-'RAY H. IVIE,
IVIE & YOlJt:IG
Attorneys

~

Defendants and
Respondents
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the.~
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of Respondents to Woodrow D. White, Attorney for Appellant,
2121 South State Street,

)
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